VANSLIEDREGT_JCI_1.DOC

6/11/2010 3:26:32 PM

EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO FIGHTING
TERRORISM
ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT*
INTRODUCTION
In this contribution to the Duke Journal of Comparative &
International Law symposium on “War Bound by Law,” I take the
opportunity to discuss European approaches to counterterrorism. I start off
by making two preliminary observations. First, while it may be that U.S.
authorities have been heavily criticized for not respecting the rule of law
because of the detention policies in Camp Delta and Guantanamo Bay and
because of the trials before military commissions instead of civilian courts,
it is by now very clear that such criticism equally applies to other western
democracies, amongst which a number of European states. Countries such
as England, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands have adopted antiterrorism measures that challenge human rights, criminal-justice principles,
and due process. Some of these measures will be discussed today.
Second, the emphasis on security, which emanates from the fight
against terrorism and challenges due process and human rights, is not a
recent phenomenon. It is not solely a reaction to the terrorist attacks in New
York, Madrid, and London. These tragic events have increased policy
makers’ attention to security issues, but attention to such issues existed
before these events. Policymakers that govern, and citizens that live, in
what may be termed the “risk society,” are greatly concerned with security.
A risk-free society is a goal that can never really be achieved but that is
strived for in a society that attempts to manage and control risks. Antiterrorist measures and their effect on the criminal law, are not new
developments, but are merely extensions of existing developments.
One distinctive feature of European anti-terrorism measures is its
emphasis on criminal law enforcement. Unlike the United States, most
European states have refrained from adopting measures under the laws of
war. Therefore, this contribution to the symposium focuses primarily on
criminal law measures. In Part I and Part II, I briefly outline some of the
anti-terrorism measures that have been taken in the aftermath of 9/11 at the
European Union level and at the Member State level, respectively. In Part
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III and Part IV, I discuss the characteristics of these measures and their
effect on criminal law and its underlying principles, respectively. I
conclude with a few comments on the relationship between law and
terrorism.
I. EUROPEAN UNION AND COUNTERTERRORISM
A. EU Framework Decisions
On September 28, 2001, a few weeks after the terrorist attack on the
World Trade Center, the Council of Ministers of the European Union
presented two legislative proposals to the European Parliament: one for a
Framework Decision on combating terrorism1 and one for a Framework
Decision on the European arrest warrant2 (“EAW”). The Framework
Decision on combating terrorism contains a definition of terrorism that has
been implemented at the Member State level and that harmonizes the laws
of the member states as to the definition of terrorism.3 It defines terrorism
as
offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may
seriously damage a country or an international organisation where
committed with the aim of:
—seriously intimidating a population, or
—unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to
perform or abstain from performing any act, or
—seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political,
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an
international organisation,
shall be deemed to be terrorist offences: (a) attacks upon a person’s life
which may cause death; (b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a
person; (c) kidnapping or hostage taking; (d) causing extensive
destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an
infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed
platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private
property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic
loss; (e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods
transport; (f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or
use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical
weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and
chemical weapons; (g) release of dangerous substances, or causing
1. The Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision
on Combating Terrorism, COM (2001) 521 final (Sept. 19, 2001).
2. The Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision
on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between the Member States, COM
(2001) 522 final (Sept. 25, 2001) [hereinafter EAW-FWD].
3. See discussion infra Part II.
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fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human
life; (h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or
any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to
endanger human life; (i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in
(a) to (h).4

In 2008, the Framework Decision was amended by adding offences that are
linked to terrorism: public provocation, recruitment, and training for
terrorism.5
The EAW entered into force on January 1, 2004. The EAW is the first
instrument applying the principle of mutual recognition of judicial
decisions.6 This means that “each national judicial authority should ipso
facto recognize requests for the surrender of a person made by the judicial
authority of another Member State with a minimum of formalities.”7 The
procedure offered by the EAW differs from classic extradition because the
surrender procedure is expedient and tied to fixed terms, while the
executive no longer plays a role in the decision-making process.8
Moreover, certain classic refusal grounds, such as the non-extradition of
nationals, no longer apply. The speciality rule—a long-standing protection
in extradition which prohibits a person from being prosecuted in the
requesting country for offences not listed in the extradition request—that is
laid down in Articles 27 and 28 of EAW is much narrower than in classic
extradition law and can be waived by the requested/surrendered person.
The EAW differs most clearly from classic extradition in that it partly
abolishes the dual criminality verification for 32 categories of offences
listed in Article 2 (“List-offenses”). The act in relation to which an EAW is
issued must be punishable under the law of the issuing state “by a custodial
sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 12 months,”
or when the sentence has already been imposed, the sentence must be for a
period “of at least four months.”9 Terrorism is a “list-offence.” The EAW
4. Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, art. 1(1), 2002 O.J. (L 164) 4 (EU).
5. Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 330) 22-23 (EU).
6. See generally The Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Mutual Recognition of Final Decision in
Criminal Matters, COM (2000) 495 final (July 26, 2000) (illustrating how mutual recognition of
judicial decisions is the cornerstone of EU cooperation in criminal matters as recognized for the first
time in the EU Meeting in Tampere, Finland in 1999).
7. EAW-FWD, supra note 2, preamble.
8. See generally Elies van Sliedregt, The European Arrest Warrant: Between Trust, Democracy
and the Rule of Law, 3 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 244 (2007).
9. Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, art. 2(1), 2002 O.J. (L 190) 2 (EU). Cf. Elies van
Sliedregt, The Dual Criminality Requirement, in THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT IN PRACTICE 51,
67 (2009) (arguing that the EAW can be regarded as an expedited and more efficient form of
extradition).

VANSLIEDREGT_JCI_1.DOC

416

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

6/11/2010 3:26:32 PM

[Vol 20:413

had been on the shelf of the European Commission for some time; it was a
controversial proposal, especially for the removal of the dual criminality
verification. The specter of terrorism hastened the legislative process
within Brussels. After the 9/11 attack the Council of Ministers felt the need
to push for this proposal.
B. Blacklisting and the Freezing of Assets
In the fight against terrorism, the Security Council of the United
Nations imposed sanctions on the basis of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
against certain individuals and/or organizations allegedly associated with
bin Laden or the Taliban.10 By blacklisting persons and organizations,
authorities can issue financial sanctions of a preventive nature on such
entities. These sanctions include the freezing of financial funds and assets
of persons or organizations. The Sanctions Committee, an organ of the
Security Council, maintains a regularly updated list of designated persons
and entities and considers requests for listing and de-listing from states and
regional organizations. Targeted individuals and entities are entitled to
submit requests for de-listing through their countries of origin or through a
“focal point” in the U.N. Secretariat.
On May 27, 2002, the European Community Council enacted
Regulation 881/2002 giving effect to measures against those who were
blacklisted by the U.N. Security Council at the European Member State
level. As a result, the assets of blacklisted individuals and organizations
have been frozen throughout the European Union. As a result of an order
by the former U.S. President George W. Bush, Yasin Abdullah Kadi, a
national of Saudi Arabia and the Al Barakaat International Foundation
were put on the U.N. blacklist. Through Regulation 881/2002, their names
were added to Annex I, which implemented the U.N. blacklist. Kadi and Al
Bakaraat sought to annul the E.C. regulations. They argued that the EU
Council lacked competence to adopt the regulation and they argued that
their right to respect for property, the right to be heard and the right to
effective judicial review had been violated.11 On September 21, 2005, the
Court of First Instance (“CFI”) rejected all claims and ruled that the CFI
10. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1735, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006); S.C. Res. 1699, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1699 (Aug. 8, 2006); S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005); S.C. Res. 1526,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004); S.C. Res. 1456, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003); S.C.
Res. 1455, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003); S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28,
2002); S.C. Res. 1363, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1363 (July 30, 2001); S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333
(Dec. 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
11. See Action Brought on 18 December 2001 by Yassin Abdullah Kadi Against the Council of
the European Union and the Commission of the European Communities, Case T-315/01, Kadi v.
Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649 (2002 O.J. (C 56) 16).
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had no jurisdiction to review (i) the lawfulness of the contested regulation
and (ii) the lawfulness of the Security Council resolution adopted under
Chapter VII.12 The CFI held that Security Council Resolutions are binding
upon the E.C. member states and that pursuant to Article 103 of the U.N.
Charter obligations under U.N. law prevail over obligations under the E.C.
Treaty.
Kadi and Al Bakaraat appealed to the European Court of Justice
(“ECJ”), which joined the two cases. The ECJ disagreed with the CFI’s
finding on lack of jurisdiction. It confirmed its full competence to review
E.C. acts by emphasizing that the E.C. Treaty is “an autonomous legal
system which is not to be prejudiced by an international agreement.”13 Yet,
the ECJ stayed away from determining the lawfulness of the Security
Council resolution. It held that a judgment by an E.C. court that an E.C. act
implementing a Security Council resolution is contrary to the E.C. legal
order did not “[e]ntail any challenge to the primacy of that resolution in
international law.”14 On the merits, the ECJ ruled that the appellants’ right
to effective judicial review and the right to be heard had been violated and
that the right to property had been unjustifiably restricted.15 The contested
E.C. regulations were annulled, but the Court gave the European
Community Council three months to remedy the flaws.16 The European
Community Council gave Kadi and Al Barakaat the opportunity to be heard
and to comment on the information that formed the basis of their inclusion
on the list. Kadi and Al Barakaat still feature on the U.N. list maintained
and updated by the Sanctions Committee.17 It is therefore no surprise that a
month before the three-month period expired, the European Community
adopted Regulation 1190/2008, which re-entered the names of Kadi and Al

12. Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, para. 58; Case T-306/01, Yusuf v.
Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533, para. 77.
13. Joined Cases 402/05 & 415/05, Kadi v. Council, 2008 ECJ Eur-Lex LEXIS 1954, para. 316
(Sept. 3, 2008).
14. Id. para. 288.
15. Id. para. 334-70.
16. It remedied the flaws by introducing Regulation 1268/2009 of 22 December 2009 “amending
Regulation (EC) No. 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain
persons and entities associated with Usama bin laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban.” Council
Regulation 1268/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 346) 42 (EU).
17. The Consolidated List Established and Maintained by the 1267 Committee with Respect to alQaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and Other Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities
Associated with Them, https://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/consolidatedlist.pdf (last updated
Apr. 22, 2010).
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Barakaat on the blacklist.18 On February 26, 2009 Kadi instituted new
proceedings before the CFI.19
II. ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION IN EUROPE
The analysis that follows concerns the specific anti-terrorism
legislation at the national level in the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, the
United Kingdom. I analyze the specific experiences of terrorism and the
reactions of each country. In particular, I chose to analyze the common
law/adversarial experience of the United Kingdom as a counterpoint to the
civil law systems of the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy. While Germany,
Italy, and the United Kingdom have a history of anti-terrorism legislation,
the Netherlands is relatively new to it.20 The four types of treatment may
make explicit certain differences that would otherwise go unnoticed. For
instance, the emphasis in English anti-terrorism law on reverse onus
provisions can be understood against the strict evidence rules in English
law and the adversarial legal system in general.
A. The Netherlands
The Moluccan islands, part of the former Dutch colonial empire in the
Far-East, were seized by Indonesian troops shortly after declaring its
independence in April 1950. The Moluccan community in the Netherlands,
a large part of whom had fought side by side with the Dutch against the
Axis powers during the Second World War, turned to the Dutch authorities
for support. When it turned out that the Netherlands was not going to
support the quest for independence, a part of Moluccan youth turned
against the Dutch authorities. In the 1970s, Moluccan youth terrorized
Dutch society in their struggle to regain the independence of the South
Moluccan Islands. The government responded with a non-criminal policy
based on dialogue and negotiations. This became known abroad as “the
Dutch approach.” Since September 11, 2001, the government has departed
from a non-criminal approach and has now criminalized terrorism. The
“Dutch approach” to negotiation has disappeared completely. In part, this is
because Islamic terrorism is very different in nature from Moluccan
terrorism. The latter was not religiously inspired, remained limited to the
Netherlands as a movement, and pursued narrowly defined political goals.
18. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1190/2008 of 28 November 2008 (amending for the 101st time
Council regulation (EC) No. 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against
certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban.).
19. Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Commission, 2009 (C-90/56). The application is available at
http://curia.europa.eu.
20. The results of this research have been published in E. van Sliedregt, Tien tegen een. Een
hedendagse bezinning op de onshuldpresumptie (with English summary), The Hague 2009.
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However, Moluccan terrorism was not less dangerous than Islamic
terrorism. On the contrary, the Moluccan attacks, which included two train
hijackings and the occupation of a primary school, claimed more victims in
the Netherlands than the Islamic terrorism that has held the world in its grip
since the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. In the
Netherlands, the death of Theo van Gogh, film director and producer who
was assassinated by a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim for his critique of the
treatment of woman in Islam, can be regarded so far as the only fatality of
post 9/11 Islam-extremism.
After 2001, the Dutch legislature adopted measures that criminalize
terrorism at a preliminary stage, meaning before any harmful acts have
taken place. The Dutch Terrorism Act (Wet terroristische
misdrijven)21criminalizes conspiring to commit terrorism (a breakthrough
considering the controversy over the concept of conspiracy in the 1970s
which was held to be criminalizing thought and thus violating fundamental
human rights), recruiting for “armed combat” (i.e., jihad) and participating
in and cooperating in terrorist training camps.22 Moreover, the Dutch
Terrorism Act increased the severity of sentences for certain common
crimes committed with a terrorist purpose.23 It expanded investigatory and
prosecutorial powers by lowering the threshold that triggers special
investigative powers: now, authorities may investigate or prosecute
suspects if they have “indications” (of a terrorist crime) instead of a
“reasonable suspicion” as is required for ordinary, non-terrorism crimes.
Moreover, the Act permits pre-trial detention for terrorism charges on the
basis of an “ordinary” suspicion instead of the more stringent requirement
of “incriminating evidence” as is required for ordinary, non-terrorism
crimes.24 The pre-trial detention can last until the start of the trial, subject
to a maximum of 27 months. During that period, the accused can be denied
access to his or her file and may not be informed of the incriminating
evidence against them. Intelligence provided by officers and special
agencies, heard in a separate procedure by a special magistrate, can be used
as evidence in a criminal trial. Lastly, participating in the continuation of
the activities of an organization that is included on a U.N. or EU sanction
list is a crime and punishable by one year imprisonment.

21. Bulletin of Acts and Decrees (Staatsblad) 2004, 290 and 373.
22. Parliamentary papers II, 2007-2008, 31 386, nr. 3, p. 5.
23. Bulletin of Acts and Decrees (Staatsblad) 2004, 290 and 373.
24. Art. 67(1) of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that pre-trial detention can be
imposed for crimes that incur a prison sentence of four years or more.
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B. Italy
Italy also passed anti-terrorist legislation after 9/11, although it
already had taken radical measures in the 1960s and 1970s to combat
domestic terror from both leftists (Brigate Rosse) and rightists (neofascists). The new terrorism legislation punished inciting, forming,
organizing, leading, or financing terrorist organizations.25 A second set of
measures adopted just after the bomb attacks in London in 2005 added to
the list crimes committed for terrorist purposes26 and the recruitment27 and
training28 of terrorists. In certain cases, a person can now be held in
preventive custody for five days without any actual suspicion against them,
during which that person may also be examined without the assistance of a
lawyer.29 Italy further enacted strict immigration measures which permit
the administrative detention and deportation of non-nationals if they appear
to constitute a threat to national security. In addition, Italy has expanded
the executive’s authority to record confidential communication and gather
information.30 Such information is gathered for preventive purposes—
information obtained can be used only for the purposes of investigation and
not at trial. However, the basis for instigating information gathering is
vague: “when it is indispensable for the prevention of terrorist activities.”31
This authority can be exercised for 40 days, but can constantly be extended
by 20 days, in theory, infinitely.
25. Id. art. 270. (1) Codice penale: Chiunque promuove, costituisce, organizza o dirige o finanzia
associazioni che si propongono il compimento di atti di violenza con finalità di terrorismo o di
eversione dell’ordine democratico (2) è punito con la reclusione da sette a quidici anni. Amended by
Act n. 438, 2001 Decreto-Legge 18 ottobre 2001, N. 374 coordinato con la Legge di Conversione 15
December 2001, n. 438 (Disposizioni urgenti per contastare il terrorismo internazionale). See
www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi. For comments, see Leonardo Filippi, ‘Terrorismo internazionale: le
nuove norme interne di prevenzione en repressione’, Diritto Penale en Processo, 2/2002, at 163-176;
Vittorio Patanè, ‘Recent Italian Efforts to Respond to Terrorism at the Legislative Level’, 4 Journal of
International Criminal Justice at 1166-80, (2006); Italian Contribution to the NCTb (National
Coordinator for Counterterrorism) Counterterrorism Project, Research and Documentation Centre
(WODC), Università degli Studi di Trento – Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Milano), January
2006, at 24.
26. Codice penale [C.P.] art. 270 sexies (Condotte con finalità di terrorismo) [Conduct with a
terrorist purpose].
27. C.P. art. 270 quarter (Arruolamento con finalità di terrorismo anche internazionale)
[Recruitement for the purpose of international terrorism].
28. C.P. art. 270 quinquies (Addestramento ad attività con finalità di terrorismo anche
internazionale) [Training for the purpose of international terrorism].
29. Act n. 155, 2005 (Nuove disposizioni in materia di arresto e di fermo) [new rules with regard
to arrest].
30. Codice di Procedure Penale [C.P.P.] art. 226 (Intercettazioni telefonische preventive) [wiretapping for preventive purposes].
31. C.P.P. art. 226(1) (“[Q]uando siano ritenute idispensabili per la prevenzione di attività
terroristiche . . . .”).
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C. Germany
Germany also has experience with counterterrorism. In the 1960s and
1970s, it suffered and fought against terrorist attacks committed by the
Rote Armee Fraktion (“RAF”). Several far-reaching counterterrorism laws
were passed in reaction to these attacks.32 The most well known and
controversial measure from that time is the Kontaktsperregesetz,33 which
made it possible to detain RAF suspects in complete isolation and seriously
limited their right to legal assistance.34 Eight days after the 9/11 attacks, the
German government presented a set of counterterrorism measures to
Parliament.35 These measures were especially important to the German
government because of the discovery that three of the four Arabic hijackers
had planned the attack on the 9/11 attack while they were living in
Hamburg. The measures expanded the description of the crime of
membership of a terrorist organization,36 and restricted the right of
association.37 A second set of measures passed several years later
broadened powers of the security services, toughened immigration laws,
and facilitated the exchange of information (intelligence) and storage of
data.38 While no new criminal provisions or powers were created, the
German government took an old investigation method used against the
RAF in the 1970s and decided to re-apply it: Rasterfahndung.39
Rasterfahndung warrants the searching of the files of banks, libraries,
universities, benefit agencies, and airline companies without any criminal
32. Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Ersten Gesetzes zur Reform des Strafverfahrensrechts [Act
extending the first Act reforming the Code of Criminal Procedure], Dec. 20, 1974, BGBl. I 1974 at
3686; Gesetz zur Änderung des Strafgezetzbuches, des Strafprozessordnung, des
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetzes, des Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung und des Strafvollzugsgesetzes [Act
amening the Code of Criminal Law, the Code of Criminal Procedure, Code on Court Constitution, the
Attorney’s Act and the Act on the Penal System], Aug. 18, 1976, BGBl. I at 2181; Gesetz zur Änderung
der Strafprozessordnung [Act amending the Criminal Procedure], Apr. 14, 1978, BGBl. I at 497.
33. Kontaktsperregesetz [The Act limiting the Advocate-Client Contact], Sept. 30, 1977, BGBl. I
S at 1877.
34. The German Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] ruled that the
Act was constitutional. BVerfG Aug. 1, 1978, 49, 24.
35. Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz [The Counter-Terrorism Act], Jan. 9, 2002, BGBl. I 2002 at
361 et seq.
36. Vierunddreißigstes Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz - § 129b StGB [The 34th Amendment Act],
Aug. 22, 2002, BGBl. I at 3390.
37. Erstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Vereinsgesetzes [First Act on Amending the Assembly Act],
Dec. 14, 2001, BGBl. I at 3319.
38. Terrorismusbekämpfungsergänzungsgesetz [Additional Terrorism Control Act], Jan. 5, 2007,
BGBI. I at 2 (F.R.G.).
39. For a critical review, see generally Rolf Gössner, Computergestützter Generalverdacht: Die
Rasterfahndungen nach “Schläfern” halten einer bürgerrechtlichen Überprüfung kaum Stand
[Computer-backed General Suspicion: Dragnet Investigations for “Sleeper Cells” Hardly Stand Up to
Civil Rights Standards], 3 VORGÄNGE 41 (2002).
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suspicion for the purpose of using a certain profile or certain characteristics
to identify and monitor suspected persons or dormant cells.
D. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has ample experience with fighting terrorism on
its own territory. Since the fight against the Irish Republican Army began
in 1922, the English legislature has adopted different measures, both
criminal and non-criminal in nature.40 Emergency legislation in those years
made internment and preventive detention possible. This hard line has
continued after 9/11. For instance, part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 200141 (“ACTSA”) provides for administrative detention of
foreign terrorism suspects42 against whom there is insufficient evidence to
detain in criminal proceedings. In 2004, the House of Lords ruled that the
detention order was in conflict with the right to liberty and the ban on
discrimination since the measure affected only non-nationals.43 The
successor to the ACTSA (which replaces Part 4 of ACTSA), the Prevention
of Terrorism Act 2005,44 (“PTA”) provides for house arrest and other
restrictions, called a “control order,” instead of detention.45 When the
conditions under which a control order is imposed are breached, such a
transgression is considered a criminal offence.46 The U.K. government
adopted the Terrorism Act 2006 (“TA 2006”) after the bomb attacks in
London in 2005.47 The Act introduced several new crimes. For instance, it

40. See generally CLIVE WALKER, BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION
(2002) (providing an overview of recent anti-terrorism legislation).
41. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24, pt. 4, §§ 21-36 (U.K.) [hereinafter
ACTSA], available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/pdf/ukpga_20010024_en.pdf. See also
Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11
September?, 65 MODERN L. REV. 724 (2002) (providing a criticism of the ATCSA).
42. See ACTSA, supra note 41, at c.24, pt. 4, § 23.
43. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, at 47, 100, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, at 144,
175 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales) (U.K.).
44. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c. 2 (U.K.) [hereinafter PTA], available at http://
www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/pdf/ukpga_20050002_en.pdf.
45. The Act provides for two types: a control order which restricts the right to liberty, id. at § 2,
and a control order which violates the right to liberty, id. at § 4. In the latter case, this is a derogating
control order, an order which, on the basis of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR”), derogates from the rights guaranteed by the ECHR because an emergency situation exists.
Id. at § 5(9). A derogating control order can be imposed by a court at the request of a Minister if “on the
balance of probabilities” (the civil standard of proof) a suspect is involved in terrorism-related
activities. Id. at § 4(7).
46. Id. at § 9. For a critical discussion of control orders, see generally Lucia Zedner, Preventive
Justice or Pre-Punishment? The Case of Control Orders, 60 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 174 (2007).
47. Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter TA], available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
acts/acts2006/pdf/ukpga_20060011_en.pdf.
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criminalized inciting terrorism, distributing terrorist writings, training
terrorists, and being present at places where terrorists are trained.48
In criminalizing terrorism, the legislature frequently used (and still
uses) legal presumptions that result in placing the burden on the accused to
prove her/his innocence.49 These so-called “reverse onus provisions” are
controversial and have in certain cases been nullified by the courts for
being a violation of the presumption of innocence. For instance, in
Kebilene,50 the House of Lords held that the decision to prosecute three
Algerian men under Section 16A (1) for “possession (of an article) in
circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the article is in his
possession for a purpose connected with the commission . . . of acts of
terrorism” should be reviewed since Section 16A was applied in violation
of the presumption of innocence.51 After all, the defense available in
Section 16A(3), which stipulates that “a person charged with an offence
under this section” requires the defendant to “prove [beyond reasonable
doubt] that the article in question was not in his possession for such a
purpose.”52 The use of evidential burdens, as opposed to the legal burden of
proof, requires a lower standard of proof. It requires “proof” on a balance
of probabilities instead of beyond reasonable doubt and is generally not
considered a violation of the presumption of innocence.53 Thus a defendant
can be asked to come forward and “prove” on a balance of probabilities
that he meets the criteria of a defence and is not criminally liable. In the
conjoined appeal in Sheldrake v. DPP and Attorney General’s Reference
No. 4 of 200254 the House of Lords decided by a majority that the reverseonus provision in section 11(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (membership of
a terrorist organization) infringed the presumption of innocence and then
converted it from a legal to an evidential burden of proof.

48. See id. at §§ 1, 5, 2, 6, and 8.
49. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence, 10 INT’L J.
EVIDENCE & PROOF 241 passim (2006); Andrew Ashworth, Security, Terrorism and the Value of
Human Rights, in SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 203, 218-19 (2007); Victor Tadros & Stephen
Tierney, The Presumption of Innocence and the Human Rights Act, 67 MODERN L. REV. 403 passim
(2004).
50. R. v. DPP, Ex p. Kebilene, [2000] 2 A.C. 326.
51. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, § 16A amended tot s. 57 of the
Terrorism Act 2000.
52. For an analysis, see generally Paul Roberts, The Presumption of Innocence Brought Home?
Kebilene Deconstructed, 118 L. Q. REV. 41 (2002).
53. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL
184-86 (1963). See also BEN EMMERSON ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 350-52
(2007).
54. AG’s Reference (No 4 of 2002), [2004] UKHL 43, [2005] 1 A.C. 246.
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Other anti-terrorism measures that have been adopted relate to
preventive detention. The TA 2006 permits the extension of “detention
without charge” from 14 to 28 days. The original Bill had gone further and
provided for 90-day detention. Then Prime Minister Tony Blair defended
the 90-day rule in the House of Commons by arguing that the police and
judicial authorities need more time to gather incriminating evidence against
terrorism suspects in order to prepare for trial. He did not receive the
desired support. This episode will go down in history as his first defeat in
the House of Commons. Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who succeeded in
obtaining an extension of detention without charge for up to 42 days from
the House of Commons, was defeated in the House of Lords on October 14,
2008.55
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF COUNTERTERRORISM LEGISLATION
One can observe several characteristics of counterterrorism legislation
from this survey of measures taken at EU and national levels: first,
terrorists are now criminalized at a preliminary stage—or as the Germans
say, “Vorfeldkriminalisierung”—before any terrorist attacks have occurred.
This is done in the European countries studied here, partly because of EU
legislation and the ensuing obligation for Member States to punish terrorist
acts such as public provocation, recruitment, and training for terrorism.
Criminalization in the preliminary stage is possible in different ways: in an
objective way, by criminalizing certain acts of endangerment, and in a
subjective way by criminalizing the purpose for which a certain action is
performed.56 In the United Kingdom, criminalization at the preliminary
stage is done on the basis of the objective model, e.g., the crimes of
endangerment. In contrast, the Netherlands have criminalized terrorism
subjectively by focusing on terrorist purpose.
Second, legislation at the EU and Member State level reflect a
broadening of investigative powers by lowering thresholds that trigger such
powers. The lower threshold is evident in the “indication” standard in the
Netherlands that permit special (i.e., intrusive) investigatory powers. In
Italy, the threshold that triggers application of investigative powers has
even been completely separated from an actual offence. Confidential
communication can be recorded if it is “indispensable for the prevention of
55. Brown was defeated by a vote of 309 votes to 118 votes. See Nicholas Watt, Falconer Leads
Assault on 42-day Plan, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 2, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/oct/
14/terrorism-uksecurity1.
56. A subjective approach has been chosen in the Netherlands. Stamhuis regrets this and argues
that it would have been more logical for the legislature to criminalize terrorist crimes and conspiracy,
just as the other crimes of endangerment in the Dutch Penal Code, by using the objective model. E.F.
STAMHUIS, GEMEEN GEVAAR 21-32 (2006).
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terrorist activities.”57 Rasterfahndung in Germany goes just as far:
intelligence units search files of banks, libraries, and universities in order to
use a certain profile to catch sight of dormant cells, although authorities
have no suspicion of terrorist activities.
Third, these laws evince the expansion of the possibility of pre-trial
detention. Pre-trial detention is already possible in the Netherlands on the
basis of an “ordinary” suspicion. In the United Kingdom, the possibility of
detention without charge has been broadened from 14 to 18 days. In Italy,
authorities may institute preventive detention for up to five days without an
actual suspicion, during which time a person can be examined without the
assistance of a lawyer.58
Fourth, recent European legislation manifest the use of non-criminal
measures to achieve a repressive effect that is similar to criminal law
measures. For instance, the U.K. practice of control orders are effectively a
type of house arrest, yet do not rise to the level of criminal law. The EU
sanction list may also be termed as quasi-criminal for its punitive effect
caused by the freezing of assets. It is notable with regard to these noncriminal measures that criminal law is “smuggled in” through the back
door. Violation of a control order is a criminal offence in England, as is
participation with an organization named on a sanction list under Dutch
law.
Fifth, these laws demonstrate that special evidentiary measures have
been developed to balance the rights of the accused and to protect the
security of information/intelligence. In the Netherlands, a special
magistrate during a separate procedure can hear intelligence officers,
whose statements can later be used at trial as evidence. In the United
Kingdom, special advocates argue the cases of those who appeal the Home
office certification of being a “threat to national security,” which triggers
the imposition of control orders.
IV. EFFECTS ON CRIMINAL LAW
Human rights advocates, nongovernmental organizations like
Amnesty International and Liberty, criminal law scholars, and the judiciary
have criticized anti-terrorism legislation in Europe. They claim that these
measures violate fundamental principles of criminal law, most prominently
the presumption of innocence. The debate over the presumption of
innocence becomes most vigorous in the context of expanding measures of
pre-trial detention. The presumption of innocence as part of due process is
57. C.P.P. art. 226(1) (“[Q]uando siano ritenute idispensabili per la prevenzione di attività
terroristiche . . . .”).
58. Id. at 13 Act n.155.
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further used by the above-mentioned critics of anti-terrorism legislation to
demonstrate the unconstitutionality of quasi-criminal law measures such as
blacklisting and control orders. These measures render criminal law and the
presumption of innocence inoperative. Furthermore, with regard to
Vorfeldkriminalisierung, or criminalization at the preliminary stage, critics
feel that the accused is presumed guilty and placed in a position where he
or she must prove their innocence.
In my mind, it is particularly Vorfeldkriminalisierung that violates the
presumption of innocence. Once behavior becomes punishable before a
harm has occurred, the line between punishable behavior and nonpunishable, everyday behavior becomes more difficult to draw. The burden
of proof for the accused to overcome consequently becomes heavier. If this
were not the case, the internalization of punishable behavior could result in
the criminalization of intentions without any objective/external element.
Or, in case the behavior has been given shape as a crime of endangerment,
it could lead to the acceptance of objective/strict liability. Increasing the
burden of proof has two possible consequences. First, it may broaden the
scope of intrusive investigation methods. Recent counterterrorism
legislation already manifests the expansion of intrusive investigation
methods. Second, increasing the burden of proof could result in a wider use
of legal presumptions, which could put the accused in the position of
having to prove their innocence. Furthermore, preventive substantive
criminal law triggers investigative powers at a much earlier stage. Some
critics argue that these offences have been created to enable the police to
use its powers at an earlier stage.
Anti-terrorism legislation also strengthens state power. By lowering
thresholds that trigger investigative and prosecutorial powers, the state
enhances its grip on individual citizens. At the same time judicial oversight
is limited because of security concerns. Legislation mindful of security
concerns has already limited the rights of the accused, such as access to
incriminating evidence and to have a counsel of choice.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The European measures discussed above strengthen the executive’s
power and weaken judicial control. It therefore parallels U.S.
counterterrorism laws. The threat of terrorism and the quest for security
emphasizes the law’s repressiveness at the detriment of the law’s
protectiveness. This causes an imbalance, distorts the functions of law, and
erodes the law’s integrity. Constitutional and judicial oversight is essential
to protect our values.
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A recent example of such judicial oversight is the European Court of
Human Rights (“ECHR”) ruling in Quinton & Gillan v. UK.59 The
applicants were journalists who complained that authorities who stopped
and searched them at a demonstration pursuant to Sections 44-47 of the
2000 Terrorism Act violated their rights under Articles 5 (right to liberty),
8 (right to privacy), 10 (freedom of expression), and 11 (freedom of
assembly) of the European Convention of Human Rights. The ECHR held
that the authority to allow for stop and seizure powers as well as the powers
themselves—applicable throughout Greater London during a 28-day
renewable period—are neither sufficiently circumscribed nor subject to
adequate legal safeguards against abuse. The ECHR vigorously scrutinized
the (alleged) safeguards, e.g., their limited temporal and geographical
scope, by referring to statistics and annual reports indicating a
disproportionate use of search and seizure powers. The safeguard system
may have been adequate on paper, but in reality it did not constitute a real
curb on the wide powers afforded to the executive.
The title of this symposium—War Bound by Law—makes it clear that
the role of law in times of war/terrorism must be one of restraint and
control. The power of the state in war must be governed by a rule of
inverse proportion: the broader the state’s power the more strictly the state
must be restrained by law. It is both necessary and possible for the
judiciary to effectuate such control based on two basic elements: necessity
and proportionality. Feldman has built upon these two elements in
proposing criteria to determine the legality of anti-terrorism legislation: (i)
there must be a clear necessity for restrictive measures, (ii) restrictions
must go no further than required, (iii) measures must be controlled by law,
and (iv) law must be cast in such a way to make sure that interference with
liberty is clearly and rationally related to the aim of protecting security.60 I
wholeheartedly endorse these criteria especially bearing in mind Allen’s
famous words in his treatise on the presumption of innocence, which have
value beyond the presumption of innocence and apply to due process and
human rights protection in general: “Only when society is emancipated
from fear – only when it can rely, in the main, on its organized protective
forces – dare it give suspected persons the benefit of the doubt.”61

59. Gillan and Quinton v. United Kingdom (Appl. No. 4158/05), Eur. Ct. H. R. (12 January 2010),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/hudoc.
60. David Feldman, Human Rights, Terrorism and Risk: The Roles of Politicians and Judges, 19
PUBLIC LAW 364, 371 (2006).
61. CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, The Presumption of Innocence, in LEGAL DUTIES AND OTHER
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 252, 272 (1931).

